RE: Risk metrics

From: Marc Heuse (Marc.Heuse@nruns.com)
Date: Fri Nov 04 2005 - 13:29:19 EST


Hi,

has anybody else have a look on the RAV metric for OSSTMM 3.0 ?
I just did - and in my opinion its horrifying.
anything which is more complicated then multiplaying more than
3 numbers is too complicated to use in a report to a client.
it is already difficult enough to explain them what their
problems are - this calculation sheet is a killer for any
consultant.

other opinions?

cheers,
marc

====================================================================
Marc Heuse
n.runs GmbH
Mobile Phone: +49-160-98925941
Key fingerprint = AE3F CDC0 8C7B 8797 BEAC 4BF8 EC8F E64B 0A84 EA10
====================================================================
 
-----Original Message-----
From: Pete Herzog [mailto:lists@isecom.org]
Sent: Freitag, 4. November 2005 13:04
To: Michael Gargiullo
Cc: Marc Heuse; RSMC; pen-test@securityfocus.com
Subject: Re: Risk metrics

Rafael,

Part of the problem is, as everyone else is telling you too, that
traditional risk metrics in pen-tests cannot be true.

We have updated this in OSSTMM 3.0. If you look at the RAV Spreadsheet
in http://www.isecom.org/securitymetrics.shtml you'll see the changes.
The OSSTMM has pulled out of RISK completely because it is so biased
(which is why it regarded qualitative methods for engaging risks in the
past).

New metrics are quantification-based-- facts only from operations used
to discern a score that stands as a foundation for any risk assessments
one plans to do as it is itself only an indicator of current operations.

While the amount of publicly available info on osstmm 3.0 and
accompanying RAVs is sparse, the spreadsheet does go into good detail
and many companies are already applying this model successfully. It
allows them to compare security in operations between companies,
industries, even departments and vectors within the same organization.
The RAVs are flexible and therefore allow then all vectors to be summed
together to provide a total for the whole organization.

Sincerely,
-pete.

Michael Gargiullo wrote:
> I agree with Marc completely.
>
> Only the company can give you those numbers. It's management's job to
> determine what their assets are, and costs involved if they loose those
> assets.
>
> You, as the Pen Tester, cannot determine what the value of a certain
> machine or service is to the company.
>
> You can however, tell them what the low hanging fruit is, and take a
> best guess as to what their "Crown Jewels" are. So you'd go for the SQL
> server, and the Active Directory, and the Radius Server, etc...
>
> As for explaining difficulty, if you have in depth knowledge of how the
> vulnerability works, and if an exploit is in the wild (proof of concepts
> count), you can state explicitly "At this moment in time, this is
> difficult to exploit, but that could change tomorrow". Remember,
> Vulnerability scans and pen tests are a snapshot (A moment in time).
> Networks change, some change yearly, some change monthly, and some
> networks change hourly.
>
> -Mike
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Marc Heuse [mailto:Marc.Heuse@nruns.com]
> Sent: Tuesday, November 01, 2005 3:22 AM
> To: 'RSMC'; pen-test@securityfocus.com
> Subject: RE: Risk metrics
>
> Hi,
>
> if there would be standard metrics, they would have been in the guide
> :-)
>
> to be serious: in risk management there are standard metrics.
> the most used one is to determine Likelyhood and Impact of a risk.
> These are then described as low/medium/high (or very low, low, medium,
> high,
> criticak; or ... well you get the picture). Or you put values in there,
> e.g. liklyhood that it happens once a year is 20%, impact would be
> $10k. This is then called Expected Anual Loss, or Anual Loss Expectancy.
> And then there is CRAMM (british standard) which uses values from 1-10
> for these.
>
> Basically it is very hard to use likelyhood and impact in a pentest
> report.
> Who can convince everyone that the liklyhood of exploition of a weak
> password
> is xx%? It just doesnt work. Then the impact - if you are not working
> within
> the company for whom you are performing the pentest, it is very, very
> hard
> to have an idea of the costs.
>
> So for pentesting - especially when providing pentest services - other
> metrics are needed. But there are no standards for that.
>>From my philosophy and experience there are just a few metrics helpful:
> criticality of a vulnerability (metric like 1: unharmful information
> gathering to 10: remote control of a complete network/infrastructure),
> and level of exposure (e.g. 1: controlled keyboard access only,
> 10: Internet connection without filtering).
> Some customers also want to know the difficulty level to exploit or
> knowledge level required by the attacker (e.g. 1: needs to be able
> to move a mouse, 10: strong reverse engineering, assembler coding,
> machine level knowledge on several platforms etc. required). But this
> is a trap - if there is a tool or exploit which you dont know, or is
> released some days/weeks later, the difficulty drops - but nobody will
> update a table in a report in return.
>
> Cheers,
> Marc
>
> ====================================================================
> Marc Heuse
> n.runs GmbH
> Mobile Phone: +49-160-98925941
> Key fingerprint = AE3F CDC0 8C7B 8797 BEAC 4BF8 EC8F E64B 0A84 EA10
> ====================================================================
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: RSMC [mailto:smcsoc@yahoo.es]
> Sent: Montag, 31. Oktober 2005 14:57
> To: pen-test@securityfocus.com
> Subject: Risk metrics
>
> Hi,
>
> As OSSTMM states, "Reports must use only qualitative
> metrics for gauging risks based on industry accepted
> methods".
> What metrics are more suitable to use in pen-testing
> services?
>
> Thanks in advance,
>
> Rafael San Miguel Carrasco
>

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