From: Loupe, Jeffrey J (JLoupe@whitneybank.com)
Date: Mon Jan 28 2008 - 16:35:29 EST
You really can't compare ESX with any of the workstation products, or
vmware server, player, etc. Workstation was built with a certain level
of interaction with the underlying OS assumed and desired, such as USB
drive detection and the like. ESX was specifically designed to host
virtual machines.
Shops that don't have the resources for a dedicated DMZ ESX host can,
with careful planning and administration, securely host virtual machines
on a DMZ and a trusted network. Shops that have the resources to have a
dedicated box should certainly consider that, since physically separate
is always more secure.
-J
-----Original Message-----
From: listbounce@securityfocus.com [mailto:listbounce@securityfocus.com]
On Behalf Of Kurt Buff
Sent: Monday, January 28, 2008 2:52 PM
To: David M. Zendzian
Cc: pen-test@securityfocus.com
Subject: Re: ESX Vmware Physically connected to different segments
There are already exploits in the wild that detect if they are running
in a virtualized environment and abort themselves. I consider that the
canary in the coal mine.
While this:
http://securitydot.net/xpl/exploits/vulnerabilities/articles/1390/exploi
t.html
isn't about ESX, it's certainly on the right road, I believe.
Kurt
On Jan 28, 2008 12:32 PM, David M. Zendzian <dmz@dmzs.com> wrote:
> Yes it does make you think twice when considering such a design,
however
> I am not familiar with exploits at a guest domain that would effect
the
> host specifically. While yes in 'theory' there could be some kernel
hook
> that could allow a guest to access the host server, and I hate to be
in
> a situation when one arrives; however, the same argument also applies
to
> shared virtual web hosts, but only the largest companies have
dedicated
> hosts for every domain, there will always be sharing happening which
is
> why virtual environments are growing in popularity.
>
> Would it not be better to examine the hooks in systems that allow
> communication / buffers / etc in virtual environments and help ensure
> that they are done correctly? I know this is not really possible with
> VMWare, but with Xen & other systems where the code is available the
> issues can at least be investigated.
>
> Now if someone has code (links/docs/etc) available the detail attacks
on
> guests effecting hosts (DOS not included, exploits taking control of
> services of a host from a guest, or accessing network or resources not
> setup for that guest), then please post them to the list so we can
> discuss the issues and how to address them.
>
> These same questions might also be applied to VLANs or other types of
> virtualization techniques that allow for greater use of the devices we
> have available. While there are fun ways to attack network vlans to
> access security domains outside of configured settings, it is the
> disclosure of these techniques that allowed for providers to secure
the
> tools to a point where I know of no business I've ever worked with
have
> dedicated network devices for every network. While I have seen
different
> equipment on "DMZ vs Internal" networks, most still use VLAN security
to
> segment those as well (it's a $ thing & usually a complexity thing,
more
> parts means more people to manage, understand, change w/ out breaking,
etc).
>
> I believe there are ways of deploying virtual technology that may not
> prevent the theoretical attack, at least provide protection against
the
> common attacks and provide for a viable solution for the small
business'
> I work with.
>
> The only way to be secure is to unplug, the rest of us have to work
for
> a living :)
>
> David
>
>
> Kurt Buff wrote:
> > Even if everything is configured properly, mixing security domains
in
> > a virtual hosting is a capital mistake.
> >
> > That's because the underlying host is also vulnerable, and attacks
> > against a guest OS in an untrusted domain can be leveraged against
the
> > host, and from there *all* guest OSes are toast, or near to it.
> >
> > Don't do it, ever.
> >
> > Kurt
> >
> > On Jan 28, 2008 5:08 AM, Loupe, Jeffrey J <JLoupe@whitneybank.com>
wrote:
> >
> >> If everything is setup properly this configuration should be
secure. The
> >> problem comes with misconfiguration. It's exceedingly easy for a
> >> careless admin to connect a vNic to the wrong vSwitch and allow
traffic
> >> meant for the DMZ onto the trusted network. In general we disallow
this
> >> practice unless only one or two trusted admins have control of the
box.
> >> Even then, we audit the configuration frequently.
> >>
> >> -J
> >>
> >> ________________________________________________________________
> >>
> >> Confidentiality Notice:
> >>
> >> This E-Mail transmission (and/or the documents accompanying it)
> >> may contain information belonging to the sender which is
> >> confidential, privileged and/or exempt from disclosure under
> >> applicable law. The information is intended only for the use
> >> of the individual(s) or entity named above. If you are not
> >> the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any
> >> disclosure, copying, distribution or the taking of any action
> >> in reliance on the contents of this information is strictly
> >> prohibited. If you have received this E-Mail transmission
> >> in error, please immediately notify us by return E-Mail or
> >> telephone to arrange for return of its contents including any
> >> documents.
> >>
> >>
> >
>
> >
------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > This list is sponsored by: Cenzic
> >
> > Need to secure your web apps NOW?
> > Cenzic finds more, "real" vulnerabilities fast.
> > Click to try it, buy it or download a solution FREE today!
> >
> > http://www.cenzic.com/downloads
> >
------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >
> >
> >
>
>
------------------------------------------------------------------------
This list is sponsored by: Cenzic
Need to secure your web apps NOW?
Cenzic finds more, "real" vulnerabilities fast.
Click to try it, buy it or download a solution FREE today!
http://www.cenzic.com/downloads
------------------------------------------------------------------------
________________________________________________________________
Confidentiality Notice:
This E-Mail transmission (and/or the documents accompanying it)
may contain information belonging to the sender which is
confidential, privileged and/or exempt from disclosure under
applicable law. The information is intended only for the use
of the individual(s) or entity named above. If you are not
the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any
disclosure, copying, distribution or the taking of any action
in reliance on the contents of this information is strictly
prohibited. If you have received this E-Mail transmission
in error, please immediately notify us by return E-Mail or
telephone to arrange for return of its contents including any
documents.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
This list is sponsored by: Cenzic
Need to secure your web apps NOW?
Cenzic finds more, "real" vulnerabilities fast.
Click to try it, buy it or download a solution FREE today!
http://www.cenzic.com/downloads
------------------------------------------------------------------------
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.7 : Sat Apr 12 2008 - 10:58:22 EDT