RE: Proof of concept - Segregation of developers

From: WALI (hkhasgiwale@gmail.com)
Date: Tue Mar 06 2007 - 12:52:40 EST


Yes..I am with you kevin ...all the way. The dangers of NOT segregating (
through logical access mechanisms) developers from the production are immense.

I was wondering, if there exists the need to physically separate these guys
vlan (disable inter vlan routing etc) of development/test and production
environment?

My only concern right now is, the threat of allowing developers be able to
ping/netstat/access production servers from their own workstations in
development environment, is if they have hard coded a backdoor entry and do
stuff in production without authorisation.

Is this concern ..genuine?

At 01:23 PM 3/5/2007 -0600, Dunn, Kevin wrote:
>WALI -
>
>I would submit that by specifying "malicious intent" in your scenario
>you are closing off the vast majority of problems that can arise in
>environments where strict controls between development, testing, and
>production environments are not applied. You original question is very
>valid - however I would be interested in responses to a broader question
>also.
>
>In my opinion, the majority of problems occur when things are "fixed" in
>production. This is a natural impulse, as the overwhelming majority of
>people in the information technology field are "fix it" people. We do
>not like to see a problem go on for a minute more than necessary.
>
>However, when development teams are allowed access to production for
>debugging and remediation, the following items can occur in the "heat of
>battle" without any malicious intent.
>
>-- A fix is created and applied - but not applied to the source code
>system so the problem re-occurs with the next code update.
>
>-- Unknown exploit code on the developers machine has access to live
>production data - potentially HIPPA or trade secret data which can cost
>significant resources if exposed.
>
>-- Ad-hoc logging and tracing functions are created, causing problems
>later when log files grow in strange, out of the way places and cause a
>server to crash due to disk or resource exhaustion.
>
>-- The same ad-hoc logging and tracing functions create logs which
>contain sensitive data which are unknown and unmonitored and
>subsequently not handled in a secure manner.
>
>-- Debugging code is activated in production which causes un-explained
>system slowness.
>
>Unfortunately for the proof of concept aspect of your question - it is
>difficult to prove that these thing will occur. However, you can show
>through mathematical analysis of an organizations operational and
>software defect percentages the likelihood of these items occurring.
>
>Hope these thoughts help. Best wishes on your research, I hope you are
>able to share the results with the list.
>
>Kevin Dunn
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